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Abstract 
The present research examined the influence of general just-world beliefs on 
aggression following ostracism. The findings provided converging support for the 
hypothesis that people with weak general just-world beliefs, either measured (Studies 
1 and 4) or primed (Studies 2 and 3), would behave more aggressively following 
ostracism than people with strong general just-world beliefs. Furthermore, perceived 
deservingness (Study 3) or attribution (Study 4) mediated the relationship between 
general just-world beliefs and aggression following ostracism. These findings 
highlight the significance of general just-world beliefs in understanding the coping 
responses to negative interpersonal experiences. The implications are discussed.  
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When Justice Surrenders: The Effect of Just-World Beliefs on  
Aggression Following Ostracism 
People have a fundamental need to maintain positive and sustainable social 
relationships (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Ostracism1, which refers to being excluded 
and rejected, thwarts such a fundamental need for belonging (see Williams, 2007, 
2009 for reviews). The literature has uncovered various detrimental consequences of 
ostracism. In particular, ostracism-related forms of relational devaluations can lead to 
aggression (e.g. DeWall, Twenge, Gitter, & Baumeister, 2009; Twenge, Baumeister, 
Tice, & Stucke, 2001). More recently, researchers have started to examine how 
motivational and situational factors interact with ostracism to predict aggression 
(Warburton, Williams, & Cairns, 2006; Leary, Twenge, & Quinlivan, 2006; Williams, 
2007, 2009). However, few studies have examined how beliefs, which are central to 
the way in which people package their experiences (Dweck, 2008), moderate the 
effect of ostracism on aggression. 
Given that beliefs are closely linked to behaviors (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 1975), it is reasonable to expect that one’s beliefs may help us understand 
when and why ostracism increases aggressive behavior. In particular, we focused on 
general just-world beliefs, which are the beliefs that we live in a just world where 
people deserve what they get and get what they deserve (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & 
Miller, 1978; Lerner & Simmons, 1966). We examined whether general just-world 
beliefs would moderate the effect of ostracism on aggressive behavior. 
Strong general just-world beliefs not only help people cope with stressful 
situations (Tomaka & Blascovich, 1994), but also inhibit anti-social urges in situations 
that involve conflicts (Nesbit, Blankenship, & Murray, 2012). Therefore, we predicted 
that strong general just-world beliefs would weaken the effect of ostracism on 
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aggression. Furthermore, we explored a mechanism for the relationship between 
just-world beliefs and aggression following ostracism. People with strong just-world 
beliefs, but not people with weak just-world beliefs, tend to believe that victims 
deserve misfortunes and negative experiences (see Dalbert, 2009; Furnham, 2003; 
Hafer & Bègue, 2005 for reviews). Thus, relative to people with strong general 
just-world beliefs, people with weak general just-world beliefs may be more likely to 
believe that they do not deserve ostracism, and hence behave more aggressively. 
Specifically, we predicted that perceived deservingness (or attribution) would mediate 
the relationship between general just-world beliefs and aggression, following 
ostracism. 
The Effect of Ostracism on Aggression 
By definition, aggressive behavior refers to an action with the intention to 
harm others, who are motivated to avoid the harm (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; 
Bushman & Huesmann, 2010). Ostracism may increase the desires to harm and hurt 
others. For example, a systematic analysis of the cases of school shootings 
demonstrate that most perpetrators had experienced ostracism and bullying from peers 
(Leary, Kowalski, Smith, & Phillips, 2003; but see also Weatherby, Strachila, & 
McMahon, 2010 for a counterargument). Moreover, a remarkable amount of 
experimental studies in laboratory settings have demonstrated that ostracism increases 
various forms of aggressive behaviors. For example, compared to included or control 
participants, ostracized participants were more likely to hurt another person by 
allocating more spicy hot sauce, blasting louder aversive white noise for longer 
periods of time, giving more negative job evaluations, and assigning longer exposure 
to painful cold water (e.g., Aydin, Fischer, & Frey, 2010; Chen, DeWall, Poon, & 
Chen, 2012; DeWall et al., 2009; Twenge et al., 2001; see also Leary et al., 2006 for a 
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review). However, it should be noted that ostracized people would not always behave 
aggressively, and they can sometime be very pro-social (e.g. Maner, DeWall, 
Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007). 
The literature has identified some situational and motivational factors, which 
may weaken the effect of ostracism on aggression (see Leary et al., 2006; Williams, 
2007, 2009 for reviews). For example, people who have been ostracized demonstrated 
a decreased level of aggression after their feelings of belonging were restored by 
recalling past social activities (Twenge et al., 2007) or experiencing mild social 
acceptance from others (DeWall, Twenge, Bushman, Im, & Williams, 2010). 
Furthermore, ostracized participants whose feelings of control were restored behaved 
less aggressively than those whose feelings of control were further deprived 
(Warburton et al., 2006). 
The appraisal of the experience of ostracism can also influence an individual’s 
corresponding responses. For instance, Wesselmann, Butler, Williams, and Pickett 
(2010) found that ostracized people would behave more aggressively when the 
ostracism experience was unexpected than when it was expected. Also, Chow, 
Tiedens, and Govan (2008) found that ostracized individuals who were given an 
unfair reason for their ostracism experience felt angrier and behaved more antisocially 
than those who were given a fair reason. Furthermore, ostracized people were more 
likely to retaliate against the source of ostracism when the ostracism experience was 
framed as representing financial losses than when it was framed as representing 
financial gains (van Beest & Williams, 2006). 
Most relevant to the current investigation, past research has suggested that 
specific beliefs may moderate the relationship between ostracism and aggression. For 
example, ostracized participants with destiny beliefs that relationships were fixed and 
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unchangeable behaved more aggressively than ostracized participants with growth 
beliefs that relationships were changeable through effort (Chen et al., 2012). 
Moreover, in a simulated game of Russian roulette (Cyberbomb), ostracized people 
who were first primed with the belief that there is an afterlife behaved less 
aggressively than ostracized people who were primed with the belief that there is not 
an afterlife (van Beest, Williams, & van Dijk, 2011). The researchers explained the 
results by suggesting that a belief in the existence of an afterlife ensured feelings of 
belonging because it implied permanent companionship and acceptance from 
potential sources of affiliation such as family and friends.  
Extending past research on how specific beliefs about relationship (Chen et al., 
2012) and afterlife (Van Beest et al., 2011) influenced the effect of ostracism on 
aggression, the current investigation further examined whether general beliefs that the 
world is just would influence the relationship between ostracism and aggression. In 
the next section, we briefly review evidence regarding the general adaptive functions 
of general just-world beliefs. Then, we discuss the potential interactive relationship 
between general just-world beliefs, ostracism, and aggressive behavior.  
Just-world Beliefs, Ostracism, and Aggression 
People need to believe that they live in a just world (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & 
Miller, 1978; Lerner & Simmons, 1966); this is critical for people to be able to 
maintain their well-being and to navigate events in their social world. Research on 
just-world beliefs has proliferated since the 1960s. More recently, the literature has 
differentiated general and personal just-world beliefs. Specifically, general just-world 
beliefs refer to the beliefs that the world is generally fair; whereas personal just-world 
beliefs refer to the beliefs that one's life events are fair (Dalbert, 1999, 2009). The 
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present research examines the role of general just-world beliefs on the effect of 
ostracism and aggression. 
Why might strong just-world believers behave less aggressively following 
ostracism than weak just-world believers? When just-world beliefs are threatened, 
people usually experience discomfort and engage in defensive behavior (see Furnham, 
2003; Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Dalbert, 2009 for reviews). For instance, people react 
angrily when they receive unfair treatment (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Solomon, 1990). 
Similarly, classroom procedural justice is negatively correlated with aggressive 
tendency toward the instructor (Chory-Assad, 2002; Chory-Assad & Paulsel, 2004). 
General just-world beliefs are adaptive because they help people cope with 
negative and stressful events. For example, Hafer and Olson (1989) found that people 
with strong general just-world beliefs perceived negative outcomes as less unfair and 
reported less resentment than those with weak general just-world beliefs. When 
confronted with a stressful laboratory task, people with strong general just-world 
beliefs reported a lower level of stress and performed better than people with weak 
general just-world beliefs (Tomaka & Blascovich, 1994). Moreover, McParland and 
Knusson (2010) found that general just-world beliefs can buffer the psychological 
distress experienced by elderly people with chronic pain. 
The literature has further shown that general just-world beliefs are negatively 
related to antisocial responses following frustrations and interpersonal conflicts. For 
example, general just-world beliefs were negatively correlated with an array of 
antisocial responses, such as problematic expressions of anger, history of aggressive 
driving behavior, and delinquency (Hafer, 2000; Nesbit et al., 2012). In addition, 
Dalbert (2002) found that participants with strong general just-world beliefs, 
compared to those with weak general just-world beliefs, reported less feelings of 
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anger (Study 2) and were better able to control their feelings of anger when describing 
an anger-provoking situation (Study 1). Moreover, relative to those with weak general 
just-world beliefs, people with strong general just-world beliefs have lower levels of 
hostile cognition when experiencing potentially injustice situations. In particular, 
drivers with strong general just-world beliefs compared to drivers with weak general 
just-world beliefs, have fewer hostile/angry thoughts and lower aggressive urges 
when they experience justice violation in a driving context (Nesbit et al., 2012). 
It should be noted that past studies that examine the relationship between 
general just-world beliefs and antisocial tendency usually do not consider the role of 
personal just-world beliefs (e.g. Nesbit et al., 2012). The relationship between general 
just-world beliefs and antisocial urges may be weakened or even become positive 
when personal just-world beliefs are controlled (e.g. Sutton & Winnard, 2007). The 
role of personal just-world beliefs on the ostracism-aggression link is beyond the 
scope of the current investigation. However, correlational research also suggests that 
personal just-world beliefs may be negatively related to antisocial responses to 
frustrations and interpersonal conflicts. For instance, Dalbert (2002) found that 
participants with strong personal just-world beliefs, relative to those with weak 
personal just-world beliefs, demonstrated less anger when describing an 
anger-provoking situation. In addition, prisoners (who were institutionally ostracized) 
with strong personal just-world beliefs were less likely to express their feelings of 
anger through outbursts of behavior, than prisoners with weak personal just-world 
beliefs (Dalbert & Filke, 2007). Moreover, Bègue and Muller (2006) found that 
adolescents with strong personal just-world beliefs reported lower levels of hostility, 
when they imagined potential conflicts with their peers.  
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In summary, the literature has provided evidence that strong general just-world 
believers may tend to inhibit aggressive intentions and behaviors, while weak general 
just-world believers may tend to respond to interpersonal conflicts with destructive or 
aggressive responses. Therefore, general just-world beliefs should interact with 
ostracism to predict aggression. Specifically, we hypothesized that people with weak 
general just-world beliefs would behave more aggressively following ostracism than 
people with strong general just-world beliefs. 
In addition to examining how general just-world beliefs influenced people’s 
aggressive responses to ostracism, the current investigation further explored a 
mechanism for such an effect. Past research has shown that people with strong general 
just-world beliefs tend to accept and justify deprivations and setbacks more readily 
than people with weak general just-world beliefs. For example, after being deprived 
of receiving a desirable outcome, people with strong general just-world beliefs 
perceive the incidence as less unfair relative to those with weak general just-world 
beliefs (Hafer & Olson, 1989). People with strong general just-world beliefs also tend 
to appraise stressful situations as challenges, while those with weak general just-world 
beliefs tend to appraise such situations as threats (Tomaka & Blascovich, 1994). More 
generally, when confronted with negative incidents and misfortunes, people with 
strong general just-world beliefs tend to believe that victims deserve their sufferings 
(see Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Dalbert, 2009 for reviews); they also make stronger 
internal attributions and weaker external attributions for their own negative 
experiences (Hafer & Correy, 1999).  
It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that following ostracism, people with 
weak general just-world beliefs may think that they do not deserve the hurtful 
ostracism experience. By making such external attributions for their ostracism 
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experience, they are more likely to behave aggressively. In contrast, those with strong 
general just-world beliefs may believe that they deserve the ostracism experience. By 
making such internal attributions for their ostracism experience, they are unlikely to 
behave aggressively. Specifically, we hypothesized that perceived deservingness (or 
attribution) of the ostracism experience would mediate the effect of general just-world 
beliefs on aggression following ostracism. 
Current Research 
Four studies were conducted to test the aforementioned hypotheses. General 
just-world beliefs were first measured (Studies 1 and 4) or manipulated (Studies 2 and 
3). The experience of ostracism was then induced via recalling a past experience 
(Study 1), playing an online ball-tossing game, (Cyberball; Studies 2 and 3), or 
imagining a workplace experience (Study 4). Afterwards, participants had an 
opportunity to behave aggressively by giving negative job evaluations (Study 1) or 
assigning another person to be exposed to painful cold water (Studies 2 to 4). We 
expected that, in all four studies, people with weak just-world beliefs, compared to 
those with strong just-world beliefs, would behave more aggressively following 
ostracism. Furthermore, we expected that perceived deservingness (Study 3) or 
attribution (Study 4) to the ostracism experience would mediate the relationship 
between general just-world beliefs and aggression following ostracism. 
Study 1 
Research has shown that ostracized people are less aggressive if they believe 
that a specific ostracism experience is fair (Chow et al., 2008). Study 1 aimed to 
extend the literature by providing an initial test of the hypothesis that people with 
weak general just-world beliefs would behave more aggressively following ostracism 
than those with strong general just-world beliefs. Participants first completed a 
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measure of general just-world beliefs (Dalbert, 1999). Next, participants recalled and 
wrote down either a past incidence of ostracism or inclusion (e.g., Chen et al., 2012; 
Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004). Finally, participants were given an opportunity 
to behave aggressively by giving a negative job evaluation (e.g., Chen et al., 2012; 
DeWall et al., 2009; Twenge et al., 2001). 
Method 
Participants and design. Eighty-one undergraduates (27 men; mean age= 
20.64; SD= 1.33) participated in exchange for a payment of HK$50. They were 
randomly assigned to the ostracism or inclusion condition.  
Procedure and materials. Participants were told that the study consisted of 
several unrelated parts. Participants first completed the six-item general just-world 
beliefs measure (Dalbert, 1999; 1= strongly disagree to 6= strongly agree). Sample 
items included “I think basically the world is a just place” and “I am confident that 
justice always prevails over injustice.” The scores were averaged to index general 
just-world beliefs (α= .66). 
By random assignment, participants then recalled and wrote down either an 
ostracism or inclusion experience (e.g., Chen et al., 2012; Pickett et al., 2004). 
Participants were instructed to describe the experience with as many details as 
possible. Afterwards, they responded to two statements, “I feel excluded” and “I feel 
rejected,” (1= not at all to 5= extremely). The scores were averaged to check the 
ostracism manipulation (r= .81, p< .001). 
Next, participants completed a job evaluation task, which was meant to assess 
their levels of aggression (e.g., Chen et al., 2012; DeWall et al., 2009; Twenge et al., 
2001). Deliberately giving a negative job evaluation was considered to be an 
aggressive behavior because it could potentially hurt another person’s chances of 
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obtaining a desirable job. Specifically, participants received a job application package 
of a candidate for a competitive research assistant position. They were told that the 
position was very competitive, and the lab was trying to receive several evaluations 
for each candidate. Participants were also told that their evaluations were very 
important and influential in making the recruitment decision. A negative job 
evaluation would decrease the candidate's chance of getting the position. Participants 
rated the candidate on six statements (e.g., “The candidate is motivated” and “The 
candidate is trustworthy”; 1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree). The scores were 
averaged to provide a job evaluation index (α= .82). Finally, participants were 
carefully probed to assess their awareness of the research hypotheses and suspicious 
thoughts about the study. A debriefing followed.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. As expected, participants in the ostracism condition 
(M= 3.11; SD= .96) reported feeling more excluded/rejected than participants in the 
inclusion condition (M= 2.06; SD= .86), F(1, 79)= 26.64, p< .001, ηp2= .25. Thus, the 
ostracism manipulation was successful. Furthermore, participants in the ostracism 
condition (M= 3.65; SD= .60) and participants in the inclusion condition (M= 3.60; 
SD= .86) reported similar levels of general just-world beliefs, F(1, 79)= .09, p= .76, 
ηp
2= .001. 
Aggression. We predicted that ostracized participants with weak general 
just-world beliefs would behave more aggressively than ostracized participants with 
strong general just-world beliefs. A hierarchical regression analysis with two steps 
was conducted (Aiken & West, 1991) to examine whether general just-world beliefs 
interacted with ostracism in predicting aggressive behavior. The ostracism condition 
was coded as 1 (ostracism) and -1 (inclusion), and general just-world-belief scores 
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were centered. 
In Step 1, the two main effects were entered into the regression analysis 
simultaneously to predict the job evaluation index. The results revealed a significant 
main effect of general just-world beliefs, b= .37, se= .11, t(78)= 3.40, p= .001. The 
main effect of ostracism was not statistically significant, b= -.11, se= .07, t(78)= -1.52, 
p= .13. 
In Step 2, the interaction term was included in the regression analysis to 
predict the job evaluation index. The results revealed a significant main effect of 
general just-world beliefs, b= .43, se= .11, t(77)= 3.96, p< .001. The main effect of 
ostracism was not statistically significant, b= -.11, se= .07, t(77)= -1.59, p= .12. More 
importantly, the predicted two-way interaction emerged, b= .26, se= .11, t(77)= 2.41, 
p< .02, ΔR2= 0.06 (Figure 1). 
Among participants with weak general just-world beliefs (1 SD below the 
mean), ostracized participants gave a more negative evaluation than included 
participants, b= -.29, se = .10, t(77)= -2.83, p< .01. Among participants with strong 
general just-world beliefs (1 SD above the mean), the evaluation did not differ across 
the ostracism/inclusion condition, b= .06, se= .10, t(77)= .63, p= .53. In addition, 
among ostracized participants, the general just-world belief was positively associated 
with job evaluation, b= .68, se= .17, t(77)= 4.07, p< .001. This association was not 
observed among included participants, b= .16, se= .13, t(77)= 1.24, p= .22. 
These findings provided initial support for the prediction that general 
just-world beliefs had implications for the relationship between ostracism and 
aggression. After recalling a past ostracism experience, people with weak general 
just-world beliefs gave a more negative job evaluation than those with strong general 
just-world beliefs. Such an evaluation would negatively impact the likelihood that an 
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applicant would be hired for a desired job. In contrast, after recalling a past inclusion 
experience, it was found that general just-world beliefs were unrelated to job 
evaluation. 
This study contributed to the literature by providing the first empirical 
evidence that people with weak general just-world beliefs would behave more 
aggressively following ostracism, while people with strong general just-world beliefs 
would not. It should also be noted that the main effect of ostracism on aggression was 
not statistically significant in this study. Although we intended to use the job 
evaluation task to measure aggression, it was possible that the task was not sensitive 
enough because it did not allow participants to directly inflict physical pain on 
another person. To address this limitation, it was desirable to replicate the findings by 
adopting another paradigm to measure aggression, which assessed participants' 
willingness to inflict direct pain on another person. Moreover, it was also desirable to 
manipulate general just-world beliefs to provide causal evidence. 
Study 2 
Study 2 extended Study 1 in two ways. First, we manipulated general 
just-world beliefs to provide causal evidence for our predictions. We adapted a 
manipulation from previous research (Laurin, Fitzsimons, & Kay, 2011) in which 
participants read an article suggesting that the world we live in is either just or not. 
Second, we adopted another paradigm to capture ostracism and aggression to provide 
multi-method convergences. After being included or ostracized in an online 
ball-tossing game (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000; Williams & Jarvis, 2006), 
participants were given an opportunity to decide on the period of exposure and 
temperature of painful cold water to which a stranger would be exposed (Aydin et al., 
2010). 
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Method  
Participants and design. Eighty-two undergraduates (26 men; mean age= 
19.60; SD= 1.30) participated in the study in exchange for course credits. They were 
randomly assigned to a 2 (strong vs. weak just-world beliefs) by 2 (ostracism vs. 
inclusion) between-subject design. 
Procedures and materials. Participants were told that this study consisted of 
several unrelated parts. Participants were first exposed to a general just-world-beliefs 
manipulation, which was modified from past research (Chen et al., 2012; Laurin et al., 
2011). Participants read a BBC-News–style article about a recently developed index 
concerning the justice and fairness of our world2. Specifically, all of the participants 
read the following:  
Since very early on, there have always been people who were concerned with 
justice, fairness, and the equal treatment of all human beings. Recent sociological 
advances have permitted researchers to establish a single unbiased index of justice 
and fairness using objective indicators such as education levels, individual wealth, 
and health outcomes. For instance, this index takes into account how well people’s 
financial outcomes and professional success are determined by their hard work and 
the education they complete, as opposed to being attributable to demographic 
variables and biased perceptions. 
Through random assignment, half of the participants were primed with strong 
just-world beliefs, and the other half of the participants were primed with weak 
just-world beliefs.  
Specifically, participants in the strong just-world beliefs condition further 
read:  
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This research has found that in the past decade, our society has become a 
much more just and fair place. In other words, it is becoming more and more likely 
that the hard work of citizens will translate into occupational success, and less likely 
that factors such as gender or family connections will have an influence. For example, 
people can succeed and improve their quality of life if they work hard regardless of 
their socioeconomic backgrounds because all people have similar opportunities and 
receive similar treatment from others. Furthermore, the inequalities between 
demographic groups in terms of physical health and emotional well-being are 
becoming smaller and smaller.  
Overall then, it seems that our society is becoming more and more just and fair, 
and all indicators point to this trend continuing over the next several years. 
Participants in the weak just-world beliefs condition further read: 
This research has found that in the past decade, our society has become a 
much more unjust and unfair place. In other words, it is becoming less and less likely 
that the hard work of citizens will translate into occupational success, and more likely 
that factors such as gender or family connections will have an influence. For example, 
the success and quality of life depends on their socioeconomic backgrounds 
regardless of their hard work because different people have different opportunities 
and receive different treatment from others. Furthermore, the inequalities between 
demographic groups in terms of physical health and emotional well-being are 
becoming bigger and bigger.  
Overall then, it seems that our society is becoming more and more unjust and 
unfair, and all indicators point to this trend continuing over the next several years. 
Afterwards, participants answered a manipulation check question, “The world 
we live in is just and fair (1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree).  
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Feelings of ostracism versus inclusion were then induced by playing an online 
ball-tossing game—Cyberball3 (Williams et al., 2000; Williams & Jarvis, 2006). 
Participants were asked to participate in a mental visualization exercise by playing an 
online ball-tossing game with two people. The game was controlled by the computer. 
Participants were asked to mentally visualize the ball-tossing experience as vividly as 
possible. Through random assignment, participants received either only two tosses at 
the beginning (ostracism condition) or received approximately one third of the total 
30 tosses (inclusion condition). After the game, participants responded to two 
statements, “I was ignored” and “I was excluded" (1= agree to 5= disagree). 
Responses were averaged to check the ostracism manipulation (r= .93, p< .001). 
Next, participants proceeded to complete the aggression task, which was 
adopted from previous research (e.g., Aydin et al., 2010). Participants were told that 
there was an upcoming study in the laboratory about physical experience and 
intellectual performance, during which participants were required to put their hands in 
ice water while working tasks that required intelligence. The experimenter further 
explained that keeping one’s hand in ice water was painful, especially when the 
temperature was low and the duration was long. Thus, it was important to find an 
unrelated person to assign the water temperature and duration. Participants then 
selected the water temperature, ranging from Level 0 (0°C) to Level 10 (10°C); and 
duration, ranging from Level 0 (0 seconds) to Level 10 (50 seconds). The reversed 
temperature level and duration were standardized and summed to create an aggression 
composite. Finally, participants were carefully probed to assess their awareness of the 
research hypotheses and suspicious thoughts about the study. A debriefing followed. 
Results and Discussion 
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Manipulation checks. As expected, participants in the strong just-world 
beliefs condition (M= 3.67; SD= 1.39) viewed the world as more just and fair than 
participants in the weak just-world beliefs condition (M= 2.58; SD= 1.11), F(1, 80)= 
15.37, p< .001, ηp2= .16. Also, ostracized participants (M= 1.95; SD= .86) reported 
feeling more ignored/excluded than included participants (M= 3.87; SD= .99), F(1, 80) 
= 85.53, p< .001, ηp2= .52. Thus, both manipulations were successful. 
Aggression. We predicted that participants primed with weak just-world 
beliefs would be more willing to harm and hurt others by assigning a longer and 
colder exposure to painful cold water than participants primed with strong just-world 
beliefs. As expected, a 2 by 2 ANOVA revealed a significant interaction effect of the 
general just-world beliefs manipulation and ostracism experience on participants’ 
aggressive behavior, F(1, 78)= 7.98, p< .01, ηp2= .09 (Figure 2). Moreover, significant 
main effects of the just-world beliefs manipulation, F(1, 78)= 4.71, p= .03, ηp2= .06, 
and the ostracism condition manipulation, F(1, 78)= 6.21, p< .02, ηp2= .07, were 
found.   
Among participants primed with weak just-world beliefs, ostracized 
participants (M= 1.22; SD= 1.91) behaved more aggressively than included 
participants (M= -.47; SD= 1.23), F(1, 78)= 13.79, p< .001. Among participants 
primed with strong just-world beliefs, inclusion (M= -.26; SD= 1.31) or ostracism 
experience (M= -.37; SD= 1.32) did not influence aggression level, F(1, 78)= 0.06, 
p= .81.  
Furthermore, following ostracism, participants primed with weak just-world 
beliefs behaved more aggressively than those primed with strong just-world beliefs, 
F(1, 78)= 11.89, p< .001. In contrast, following inclusion, participants in the two 
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just-world beliefs conditions did not differ on their levels of aggression, F(1, 78)= .23, 
p= .64.  
Thus, the priming of general just-world beliefs weakened the relationship 
between ostracism and aggressive behavior. Ostracized participants primed with weak 
just-world beliefs behaved more aggressively than ostracized participants primed with 
strong just-world beliefs. The just-world beliefs priming, however, did not reliably 
influence included participants’ aggressive behavior. 
The findings of Studies 1 and 2 provided converging support for the 
hypothesis that people with weak just-world beliefs, either measured or primed, 
behaved more aggressively than people with strong just-world beliefs. Although these 
findings were clear, what remained uncertain was the underlying mechanism of the 
relationship between general just-world beliefs and aggression following ostracism. 
We proposed that participants with weak just-world beliefs would be more likely to 
believe that they did not deserve the ostracism experience when they were ostracized, 
which might explain why these participants showed greater aggression following 
ostracism than those participants with strong just-world beliefs. 
Study 3 
Study 3 aimed to examine an underlying mechanism of the effect of general 
just-world beliefs on aggression following ostracism. We predicted that people with 
weak general just-world beliefs would report feeling less deserving of an ostracism 
experience when they were ostracized, which should mediate the effect of general 
just-world beliefs on aggression following ostracism. We also examined an alternative 
hypothesis by testing whether the potential difference in affect following ostracism 
would account for the effects we observed.  
Method  
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Participants and design. Eighty-four undergraduates (25 men; mean age= 
18.76; SD= 1.32) participated in the study in exchange for course credits. They were 
randomly assigned to either the strong- or the weak just-world beliefs condition.  
Procedures and materials. The procedures of Study 3 duplicated those of 
Study 2 with the exception that all participants were exposed to an ostracism 
experience. Through random assignment, participants were first primed with 
just-world beliefs using the articles suggesting either a just world or an unjust world. 
Afterwards, participants were given the same manipulation check that was used in the 
previous study: “The world we live in is just and fair,” (1= strongly disagree to 7= 
strongly agree). 
Next, participants were asked to engage in a mental visualization exercise 
elicited by playing the online ball tossing game (Cyberball; e.g., Williams et al., 2000). 
During the game, all participants were ostracized and only received two tosses at the 
beginning and none afterwards. Participants then completed a three-item measure to 
capture their feelings of perceived deservingness of the ostracism experience (i.e., “I 
deserve this ostracism experience”, “I deserve to be ostracized”, and “I feel I 
deserved”; 1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree; see Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, 
& Weinblatt, 1999). The scores were averaged to index perceived deservingness of the 
ostracism experience (α = .71). Also, participants completed the Positive Affect and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; 1= not at all; 
5= extremely). The scores were averaged to provide separate indices of positive affect 
(α = .87) and negative affect (α = .81).  
Finally, as in Study 2, participants were told that the laboratory had an 
upcoming study about physical experience and intellectual performance, during which 
participants were required to put their hands in ice water while working on 
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intelligence tasks. Participants selected the water temperature, ranging from Level 0 
(0°C) to Level 10 (10°C), and duration, ranging from Level 0 (0 seconds) to Level 10 
(50 seconds). As in Study 2, the reversed temperature level and duration were 
standardized and summed to create an aggression composite. A debriefing followed. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. As expected, participants in the weak just-world beliefs 
condition (M= 2.46; SD= 1.11) viewed the world as less just and fair than participants 
in the strong just-world beliefs condition (M= 4.07; SD= 1.35), F(1, 82)= 35.53, 
p< .001, ηp2= .31. 
Positive and negative affect. Following ostracism, the positive affect reported 
by participants in the weak just-world beliefs condition (M= 2.19; SD= .79) did not 
differ from that reported by participants in the strong just-world beliefs conditions 
(M= 2.28; SD= .72), F(1, 82)= .26, p= .61, ηp2= .003. However, following ostracism, 
participants in the weak just-world beliefs condition (M= 2.04; SD= .67) reported 
negative affect at a marginally higher level than participants in the strong just-world 
beliefs condition (M= 1.78; SD= .57), F(1, 82)= 3.63, p= .06, ηp2= .04. 
Perceived deservingness and aggression. We predicted that participants 
primed with weak just-world beliefs would feel less deserving of the ostracism 
experience and as a result would show more willingness to hurt others by assigning a 
longer and colder exposure to painful cold water than participants primed with strong 
just-world beliefs. As expected, participants in the weak just-world beliefs condition 
(M= 1.55; SD= .74) rated the ostracism experience as less deserved than participants 
in the strong just-world beliefs condition (M= 2.16; SD= 1.00), F(1, 82)= 9.34, 
p= .002, ηp2= .11. Moreover, participants in the weak just-world beliefs condition (M 
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= .25; SD = .90) behaved more aggressively than participants in the strong just-world 
beliefs condition (M= -.24; SD= 1.25), F(1, 82)= 4.19, p= .04, ηp2= .05. 
Mediation analyses. A bootstrapping mediation analysis with 5,000 iterations 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004) was conducted to examine whether perceived 
deservingness mediated the effect of general just-world beliefs on aggression 
following ostracism. The experimental condition was coded as 1 (strong just-world 
beliefs) or -1 (weak just-world beliefs). The results revealed an indirect effect, with a 
point estimate of -.10. The 95% confidence interval for the indirect path coefficient 
through perceived deservingness excluded zero (-.26 to -.01), suggesting a significant 
indirect effect (see Figure 3). The effect of general just-world beliefs on aggression 
following ostracism became statistically insignificant (from standardized β= -.22, 
p= .04 to standardized β= -.13, p = .24), when perceived deservingness was included 
in the regression model. Moreover, perceived deservingness still uniquely predicted 
aggression following ostracism (standardized β= -.27, p= .02), after controlling for 
general just-world beliefs. 
Another bootstrapping analysis was conducted to examine whether differences 
in negative affect would account for the relationship between general just-world 
beliefs and aggression following ostracism. The results revealed an indirect effect, 
with a point estimate of .02. The 95% confidence interval for the indirect path 
coefficient through negative affect did not exclude zero (-.03 to .11), suggesting that 
the indirect effect was not statistically significant.  
A multiple mediators bootstrapping analysis was also conducted, in which 
perceived deservingness, positive affect and negative affect were simultaneously 
entered as mediators operating in parallel. The results revealed that the indirect path 
coefficient via perceived deservingness still excluded zero (-.25 to -.01), while the 
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indirect path coefficient via positive (-.02 to .05) and negative affect (-.04 to .11) 
included zero. Therefore, perceived deservingness still significantly mediated the 
effect of general just-world beliefs on aggression following ostracism after controlling 
the effects of positive and negative affect.  
Study 3 provided additional evidence that people with weak general just-world 
beliefs behaved more aggressively following ostracism than people with strong 
general just-world beliefs. Moreover, we provided a mechanism to explain such an 
effect. We showed that perceived deservingness mediated the effect of general 
just-world beliefs on aggression following ostracism.  
Our first three studies provided consistent support to our prediction that 
general just-world beliefs carry implications for the effect of ostracism on aggression. 
However, the experimental conditions (i.e. inclusion or ostracism) in previous studies 
differ in both social relationship status and mood valence. It was desirable to replicate 
our findings by examining whether general just-world beliefs moderated the effect of 
ostracism on aggression, when compared with a negative non-social experience. 
Moreover, it was desirable to conceptually replicate our mediation model by 
measuring individual differences in general just-world beliefs and assessing 
participants’ attributions for their experiences, as corroborating evidence of perceived 
deservingness. Study 4 was conducted to address these issues4. 
Study 4 
Study 4 aimed to replicate and extend the above studies by adopting a negative 
control condition. As misfortune experience is a popular negative control experience 
in ostracism research (e.g., Twenge et al., 2001; Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & 
Twenge, 2005), we examined the role of general just-world beliefs on the effect of 
ostracism on aggression with that of a misfortune control experience. Participants first 
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completed a measure of general just-world beliefs (Dalbert, 1999). Next, ostracism 
were induced though imagination (Filipkowski & Smyth, 2012; Poon, Chen, & 
DeWall, 2013). Participants imagined that they experienced ostracism or misfortunes 
in a workplace, and they were asked to make attributions for their experience. Finally, 
participants were given an opportunity to aggress against a stranger. 
Participants and design. Ninety-seven individuals in the United States 
completed this study in exchange for a payment of US$0.3. Participants were 
recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a website that can recruit representative 
samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). The participants were randomly 
assigned to either the ostracism or misfortune condition. One outlier was detected in 
the attribution measure. This participant was removed from the analyses; thus our 
final sample consisted of ninety-six participants (37 men; mean age= 31.41; SD= 
12.07). Keeping this participant in the analyses did not alter the results. 
Procedures and materials. Participants were told that the study consisted of 
two unrelated parts. In the first part, participants first completed the six-item general 
just-world beliefs questionnaire (Dalbert, 1999; 1= strongly disagree to 6= strongly 
agree). The scores were averaged to index general just-world beliefs (α= .80).  
Participants were then exposed to an ostracism manipulation, which was 
elicited through imagination (Filipkowski & Smyth, 2012; Poon et al., 2013). 
Participants were asked to imagine that they were a new employee of a company. 
Through random assignment, participants in the ostracism condition imagined that 
they were ostracized by colleagues; while participants in the misfortune condition 
were asked to imagine that they frequently experienced accidental physical injuries. 
Participants then indicated how they felt during the imagination: “I feel socially 
excluded”, “I feel rejected”, “The experience is negative”, and “The experience is 
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aversive” (1= not at all to 5= extremely). The scores of the first two items were 
averaged to assess the ostracism manipulation (r= .74, p< .001), and the scores of the 
latter two items were averaged to determine whether participants rated the ostracism 
and misfortune experiences as equally negative (r= .44, p< .001). Participants also 
indicated the extent to which they agreed with the statement "I vividly imagine the 
experience" (1= strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree).  
Next, participants were asked to make attributions for the experience they 
imagined. We included three items assessing the extent to which participants thought 
their imagined experience was due to internal or external factors (e.g. “is the cause of 
the experience something that reflects an aspect of yourself or an aspect of the 
situation?”; see McAuley, Duncan, & Russell, 1992; Russell, 1982). The scores were 
averaged to index participants' attributions, with higher scores indicated more internal 
attributions (1= external attributions; 9= internal attributions; α= .63). 
In the second part, participants were given the opportunity to aggress against a 
stranger. Similar to Studies 2 and 3, participants were told that the lab had another 
study testing how physical simulation influences intellectual performance, which 
requires its participants to put their hands into painful cold water. Participants decided 
how long and how cold the person in the other study needed to put his or her hand in 
cold water. The temperature (ranged from 10°C to 0 °C) and duration level (ranged 
from 0 seconds to 50 seconds) was standardized and summed to create an aggression 
composite. 
Finally, participants completed the four-item Perceived Awareness of the 
Research Hypothesis (PARH) scale (e.g. “I knew what the researchers were 
investigating in this research”; 1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree; Rubin, Paolini, 
& Crisp, 2010). Scores were averaged to check participants' perceived awareness of 
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research purposes (α= .85). Participants were also asked to write down the perceived 
research purpose and suspicious thoughts (if any) during the study. A debriefing 
followed.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks. As expected, participants in the ostracism condition 
(M= 4.39; SD= .74) reported feeling more excluded/rejected than participants in the 
misfortune condition (M= 2.89; SD= 1.13), F(1, 94)= 60.15, p< .001, ηp2= .39. 
Moreover, participants in the ostracism condition (M= 4.03; SD= .76) and participants 
in the misfortune condition (M= 4.09; SD= .76) rated the two experiences as equally 
negative, F(1, 94)= 0.14, p= .71, ηp2= .001. Furthermore, participants in the ostracism 
(M= 5.12; SD= 1.66) and misfortune condition (M= 4.63; SD= 1.61) reported similar 
vividness of imagination, F(1, 94)= 2.14, p= .15, ηp2= .02. Two one-sample t tests 
revealed that participants in both condition could vividly imagine the experience, as 
their scores were significantly higher than the item's mid-point (ts> 2.65, ps<= .01). 
Thus, the manipulation was successful. Moreover, participants in the ostracism 
condition (M= 3.58; SD= .89) had similar levels of general just-world beliefs to 
participants in the misfortune condition (M= 3.54; SD= .99), F(1, 94)= .05, p= .82, 
ηp
2= .001. 
Attribution. Given that people with strong general just-world beliefs tend to 
make internal attributions for their own negative experiences (Hafer & Correy, 1999), 
we expected that positive relationships between general just-world beliefs and internal 
attributions would be observed among participants in the ostracism and misfortune 
condition. A hierarchical regression analysis with two steps was conducted (Aiken & 
West, 1991) to examine whether general just-world beliefs interacted with ostracism 
in predicting participants’ attributions for the imagined experience. The ostracism 
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condition was coded as 1 (ostracism) and -1 (misfortune), and general 
just-world-belief scores were centered. 
In Step 1, the two main effects were entered into the regression simultaneously 
to predict attribution. The results revealed a significant main effect of general 
just-world beliefs, b= .38, se= .16, t(93)= 2.34, p= .02. The main effect of ostracism 
was also significant, b= -.35, se= .15, t(93)= -2.35, p= .02. 
In Step 2, the interaction term was entered into the regression analysis to 
predict aggression. The results revealed a significant main effect of general just-world 
beliefs, b= .38, se= .16, t(92)= 2.35, p= .02. The main effect of ostracism was also 
significant, b= -.35, se = .15, t(92)= -2.34, p= .02. However, no interaction effect 
emerged, b= .06, se= .16, t(92)= 0.37, p= .71, ΔR2= 0.001. 
The results revealed participants in the ostracism condition made less internal 
attributions than participants in the misfortune condition. Moreover, participants with 
strong general just-world beliefs made more internal attributions for both ostracism 
and misfortune experience than participants with weak general just-world beliefs. 
Aggression. We predicted that following ostracism, participants with weak 
general just-world beliefs would behave more aggressively than participants with 
strong general just-world beliefs. Another hierarchical regression analysis with two 
steps was conducted to examine whether general just-world beliefs interacted with 
ostracism in predicting aggressive behavior.  
In Step 1, the two main effects were entered into the regression analysis 
simultaneously to predict aggression. The results revealed a significant main effect of 
ostracism, b= .38, se= .16, t(93)= 2.37, p= .02. The main effect of general just-world 
beliefs was not statistically significant, b= -.24, se= .17, t(93)= -1.41, p= .16. 
In Step 2, the interaction term was entered into the regression analysis to 
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predict aggression. The results revealed a significant main effect of ostracism, b= .38, 
se= .16, t(92)= 2.43, p< .02. The main effect of general just-world beliefs was not 
statistically significant, b= -.27, se= .17, t(92)= -1.59, p= .12. More importantly, the 
predicted two-way interaction emerged, b= -.39, se= .17, t(92)= -2.29, p < .03, ΔR2= 
0.05 (Figure 4). 
Among participants with weak general just-world beliefs (1 SD below the 
mean), participants in the ostracism condition behaved more aggressively than 
participants in the misfortune condition, b= .74, se = .22, t(92)= 3.33, p= .001. 
Among participants with strong general just-world beliefs (1 SD above the mean), 
aggression did not differ across the ostracism/misfortune condition, b= .02, se= .22, 
t(92)= .09, p= .93. In addition, among participants in the ostracism condition, general 
just-world beliefs were negatively associated with aggression, b= -.65, se= .25, t(92)= 
-2.65, p< .01. This association was not observed among participants in the misfortune 
condition, b= .12, se= .23, t(92)= .51, p= .61. 
Mediation analysis. We predicted that attribution would mediate the 
relationship between general just-world beliefs and aggression following ostracism. 
Because we did not have theory-driven predictions about the relationship between 
misfortune experience, attribution and aggression, we tested mediation in the 
ostracism condition only. A series of regression analyses were conducted. In the first 
analysis, general just-world beliefs were negatively correlated with aggression 
following ostracism (standardized β= -.35, p= .01). In the second analysis, general 
just world beliefs were positively correlated with internal attribution for ostracism 
experience (standardized β= .29, p< .05). In the third analysis, the correlation between 
general just-world beliefs on aggression following ostracism became statistically 
insignificant (standardized β= -.24, p= .07) when internal attribution was 
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simultaneously included in the regression model. Moreover, internal attribution still 
uniquely predicted aggression following ostracism (standardized β= -.37, p< .01) after 
controlling for general just-world beliefs.  
Furthermore, a bootstrapping analysis with 5,000 iterations was conducted 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004) to examine whether the indirect effect was statistically 
significant. The results revealed an indirect effect, with a point estimate of -.20. The 
95% confidence interval for the indirect path coefficient through internal attributions 
of ostracism experience excluded 0 (-.51 to -.01), suggesting a significant indirect 
effect (Figure 5)5.  
Demand characteristics. Participants in the ostracism condition (M= 3.20; 
SD = 1.31) had similar awareness of research hypotheses with participants in the 
misfortune condition (M= 3.05; SD = 1.54), F(1, 94)= .25, p= .62, ηp2= .003. Two one 
sample t tests revealed that participants in both conditions disagreed that they were 
aware of the research hypotheses as their scores were significantly lower than the 
mid-point of the scale (ts> 4.17, ps< .001). Moreover, no measure in the study was 
significantly correlated with PARH scores (all ps> .05). Therefore, there was no 
evidence that our results could be explained by the influence of demand 
characteristics. 
General Discussion 
Ostracism is an aversive interpersonal experience that elicits intense painful 
feelings (e.g., Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003). Ostracized people 
sometimes have higher aggressive urges. The literature has speculated and 
demonstrated that some motivational and situational factors may moderate the effect 
of ostracism on aggression (see Leary et al., 2006; Williams, 2007, 2009 for reviews). 
For example, ostracized people may behave aggressively to restore their feelings of 
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control (Warburton et al. 2006). However, relatively less research attention has been 
devoted to examine the role of beliefs on the effect of ostracism on aggression. Given 
that beliefs can significantly influence one's behaviors (e.g. Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975), it is reasonable to expect that people’s belief systems may influence 
their aggressive responses following ostracism.  
Building upon past correlational findings that general just-world beliefs help 
to cope with stress (e.g. Tomaka & Blascovich, 1994; Hafer, 1999) and inhabit 
antisocial urges (e.g., Hafer, 2000; Nesbit et al., 2012), we proposed that strong 
endorsement of general just-world beliefs would weaken the relationship between 
ostracism and aggression. Consistent with this prediction and prior correlational 
findings, we found that individuals with strong general just-world beliefs (either 
measured or primed) behaved less aggressively following ostracism than individuals 
with weak general just-world beliefs. In contrast, general just-world beliefs had no 
statistically reliable influence on aggression among participants in the inclusion or 
control (misfortune) condition. To conclude, these multi-method convergent findings 
suggest that general just-world beliefs, either measured or primed, play a critical role 
in determining whether or not people would behave aggressively following ostracism 
We also examined a mechanism to explain why ostracized people with weak 
general just-world beliefs behave more aggressively than ostracized people with 
strong general just-world beliefs. People with strong general just-world beliefs believe 
that people live in a world where people deserve what they get and get what they 
deserve (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978; Lerner & Simmons, 1966). 
Correspondingly, people with strong general just-world beliefs tend to believe that 
sufferers deserve their experiences (see Dalbert, 2009; Hafer & Bègue, 2005 for 
reviews). Thus, we proposed that people with strong just-world beliefs would be more 
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likely to perceive that they deserve their ostracism experience and, so, behave less 
aggressively. In contrast, people with weak general just-world beliefs would be more 
likely to perceive that they do not deserve the ostracism experience and, so, behave 
more aggressively. As expected, we found that perceived deservingness of the 
ostracism experience mediated the effect of general just-world beliefs on aggressive 
behavior following ostracism (Study 3). Moreover, we found that attribution (which 
served as corroborating evidence of perceived deservingness) also mediated the 
relationship between general just-world beliefs and aggression following ostracism 
(Study 4). 
We ruled out an alternative explanation for our observed results in Study 3. We 
found that affect did not mediate the effect of general just-world beliefs on aggression 
following ostracism. Perceived deservingness of ostracism still accounted for the 
effect of general just-world beliefs on aggression following ostracism after controlling 
for the effect of affect. This finding is consistent with prior findings that affect usually 
does not account for the effect of ostracism on aggression (e.g. Buckley, Winkel, & 
Leary, 2004; Twenge et al. 2001; see also Blackhart, Nelson, Knowles, & Baumeister, 
2009; Gerber & Wheeler, 2009 for meta-analyses). 
The present findings complement other recent findings by offering additional 
explanations to understand why some people would behave aggressively following 
ostracism. For example, our current findings may explain why people with high 
destiny beliefs that relationships are unchangeable would behave aggressively 
following ostracism (Chen et al., 2012). People with strong general just-world beliefs 
focus more on long-term goals and investments (Hafer, 2000) and demonstrate higher 
interpersonal trust (Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977). Individuals who believe that 
damaged relationships cannot be improved even through effort may imply that they 
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do not believe the world is just. Therefore, such people may behave aggressively 
following ostracism.  
Moreover, the present findings may also explain why people who experienced 
unexpected ostracism would behave more aggressively than people who experienced 
expected ostracism (Wesselmann et al., 2010). In this study, before the ostracism 
manipulation, participants had either positive or negative interactions with the sources 
of ostracism. The researchers found that ostracized participants who had prior positive 
interactions (i.e., ostracism was unexpected) would deliver more hot sauce to a 
stranger who disliked spicy food than ostracized participants who had prior negative 
interactions (i.e., ostracism was expected). The researchers suggested that predictive 
control over an interaction weakened the relationship between (expected) ostracism 
and aggression. Our findings may further suggest that the prior positive interactions 
with ostracizers may lead ostracized people to believe that the ostracism experience is 
unjust and that they do not deserve the ostracism experience; thus, they behave 
aggressively. In contrast, the prior negative interactions with ostracizers may lead 
ostracized people to believe that the ostracism is just and that they deserve the 
ostracism experience; thus, they do not behave aggressively.  
The present findings also shed light on the mixed evidence as to whether 
general just-world beliefs can buffer antisocial urges. In particular, some studies have 
found that general just-world beliefs are negatively correlated with antisocial 
responses, such as delinquency (Hafer, 2000) and aggression (Nesbit et al., 2012). 
Moreover, people with high general just-world beliefs are better able to control their 
anger upon provocation (Dalbert, 2002). However, some researchers have suggested 
that personal (rather than general) just-world beliefs were negatively associated with 
anger and hostility (Bègue & Muller, 2006; Dalbert & Filke, 2007). In the present 
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research, we found that general just-world beliefs could weaken displaced aggression 
against strangers following ostracism, but they were unrelated to displaced aggression 
following social inclusion or negative non-social misfortune experience. These 
findings suggest that general just-world beliefs may weaken aggressive urges in 
interpersonal conflicts, but they may be unrelated to aggressive urges in 
non-provoking situations. 
More broadly, general just-world beliefs may carry implications for 
understanding various responses to ostracism. In particular, some ostracized people 
would behave prosocially and helpfully toward potential sources of affiliations 
(Maner et al., 2007). One of the underlying assumptions of this prosocial motive is the 
belief that prosocial effort can earn social acceptance. As noted above, people with 
strong general just-world beliefs are willing to invest in the future (Hafer, 2000). Thus, 
such people are more willing to help and trust others in general (Zuckerman, 1975; 
Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977). In the face of ostracism, people with strong just-world 
beliefs should be willing to behave prosocially. Conversely, people with weak 
just-world beliefs may not believe that prosocial effort can lead to social acceptance, 
thus they may not be motivated to behave prosocially following ostracism. 
Furthermore, general just-world beliefs may have other positive implications 
with respect to coping with ostracism. Research has identified the adaptive functions 
of just-world beliefs on the well-being of victims in stressful situations (e.g., Tomaka 
& Blascovich, 1994). Ostracism can be disastrous, leading to an assortment of 
maladaptive behaviors such as irrational risk taking, selfish behavior, dishonest 
behavior, self-regulation failure, and self-defeating behavior (Baumeister, DeWall, 
Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005; Poon et al., 2013; Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister, 
2002). The present findings indicate that people with weak general just-world beliefs 
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may be more likely to develop such maladaptive behaviors than people with strong 
general just-world beliefs. Future research may test these possibilities. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
The present research provides converging support for the hypothesis that 
people with weak general just-world beliefs are more prone to aggressive responses 
following ostracism than people with strong general just-world beliefs because of 
their perceived deservingness (or attribution) of ostracism experience. However, there 
are several limitations, which warrant further research attention. 
First, the present research examined a seemingly adaptive function of general 
just-world beliefs in coping with ostracism as the beliefs weakened the relationship 
between ostracism and aggressive behavior. However, would the belief that one 
deserves the ostracism experience have negative consequences and implications? In 
some cases, ostracism-related experiences can lead to social withdrawal (Molden, 
Lucas, Gardner, Dean, & Knowles, 2009), negative perceptions of others (DeWall et 
al., 2009), depression (see Allen & Badcock, 2003), and even suicidal ideations (see 
Van Orden, et al. 2010). Would people with strong general just-world beliefs be more 
prone to these negative effects because of their beliefs that they deserve the ostracism 
experience? Future research is needed to determine when and why general just-world 
beliefs are adaptive or maladaptive in coping with ostracism. We believe such 
investigations could help shed light on the multiple factors at play in coping with 
ostracism. 
Second, ostracism varies in severity, certainty, and motive in daily life (Chen, 
Law, & Williams, 2010). The present research manipulated the presence or absence of 
ostracism, and it is unclear whether people with weak general just-world beliefs 
would behave aggressively following milder forms of ostracism (e.g., information 
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ostracism; Jones, Carter-Sowell, Kelly, & Williams, 2009, and linguistic ostracism; 
Dotan-Eliaz, Sommer, & Rubin, 2009). Future studies may fill these research gaps. In 
addition, many forms of ostracism exist (Nezlek, Wesselmann, Wheeler, & Williams, 
2012), such as role-prescribed ostracism (e.g., the form that waiters experience at 
work when they are serving customers), punitive ostracism (e.g., the form that 
criminals experience because they have done something illegal), and oblivious 
ostracism (e.g., the form that a person experiences when others do not recognize or 
attend to him or her). Future research is needed to examine whether different forms of 
ostracism would also moderate the relationship between general just-world beliefs and 
aggression following ostracism.  
Third, our experiment did not offer participants a prospect of reconnecting 
with others. Past research has demonstrated that social acceptance experienced by 
ostracized people reduces their self-reported distress (Tang & Richardson, 2013) and 
brain activations (e.g., in the ventral anterior cingulate cortex) involved in the 
experience of physical pain and ostracism (Onoda et al., 2009). Moreover, a small 
experience or expectation of positive social interactions would reduce one’s 
aggressive urges after ostracism (DeWall et al., 2010; Twenge et al., 2007). Future 
research is needed to examine how restoring feelings of belongingness through 
prospective or actual social inclusion could reduce the aggressive urges of ostracized 
people with weak general just-world beliefs.  
Fourth, we found that perceived deservingness (or attribution) of ostracism 
experience mediated the relationship between general just-world beliefs and 
aggression following ostracism. It is likely that other psychological mechanisms are 
operating to influence this relationship. In particular, future studies can examine 
whether the effects of general just-world beliefs on aggression following ostracism is 
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mediated by personal just-world beliefs. We also speculate that one’s sense of control 
may play a role in the relationship. Past research has shown that perceived loss of 
control is related to aggression after ostracism (Warburton et al., 2006). People with 
weak just-world beliefs may feel that they have less control over situations (see 
Furnham & Procter, 1989). Therefore, it is possible that relative to people with strong 
just-world beliefs, the feelings of control of people with weak just-world beliefs may 
be thwarted more easily and severely after ostracism, thus making such people more 
prone to aggressive behavior. 
Fifth, we did not examine the role of culture in influencing the observed 
results. The literature has shown that culture and life circumstances may influence the 
psychological function of general just-world beliefs. In particular, Chinese may tend 
to endorse general just-world beliefs more than their western counterparts (Wu et al., 
2011). In studies 1 to 3, our participants were undergraduate students from Hong 
Kong. Given that the psychological function and meaning of general just-world 
beliefs may depend on culture and life circumstances, it may be fruitful to directly 
examine the impacts of culture and life circumstances on the relationship between 
general just-world beliefs, ostracism, and aggression. 
Finally, we did not examine the potential impact of targets of aggression on 
the interactive effect of general just-world beliefs and ostracism on aggression. The 
current studies measured displaced aggression toward a stranger who was not 
involved in the previous social interaction, and found that general just world beliefs 
decrease people’s displaced aggressive urges. However, the literature has also shown 
that general just-world beliefs may promote vengeance and revenge against 
transgressors. For example, Kaiser, Vick, and Major (2004) found that American 
participants with strong general just-world beliefs had higher desires for revenge 
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against terrorists of the 9/11 attacks. Future research may examine whether people 
with high general just-world beliefs are more aggressive against sources of ostracism 
to restore the general justness of the world. 
Conclusion 
The present research aimed to further understand when and why ostracized 
people behave aggressively. The current findings suggest that general just-world 
beliefs weaken the relationship between ostracism and aggression. After ostracism, 
people with weak general just-world beliefs behave more aggressively, while people 
with strong general just-world beliefs do not. A better understanding of the role of 
general just-world beliefs in one’s behavior following ostracism would be helpful in 
uncovering the mysterious complexity of responses to ostracism. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Job evaluation as a function of ostracism condition and general beliefs in a 
just world (Study 1).  
Figure 2. Aggression as a function of ostracism condition and general just-world 
beliefs (Study 2). Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
Figure 3. Perceived deservingness mediates the relationship between general 
just-world beliefs on aggressive behavior following ostracism (Study 3). Coefficients 
are standardized. 
Figure 4. Aggression as a function of ostracism condition and general beliefs in a just 
world (Study 4).  
Figure 5. Internal attribution mediates the relationship between general just-world 
beliefs on aggressive behavior following ostracism (Study 4). Coefficients are 
standardized. 
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Figure 1. Job evaluation as a function of ostracism condition and general beliefs in a 
just world (Study 1).  
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Figure 2. Aggression as a function of ostracism condition and general just-world 
beliefs (Study 2). Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
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General Just-world Beliefs 
Perceived Deservingness   
 Aggression Behavior  
β= .33** β= -.27* 
 
(β= -.13, ns) 
Figure 3. Perceived deservingness mediates the relationship between general 
just-world beliefs on aggressive behavior following ostracism (Study 3). Coefficients 
are standardized.  
**p< .01, *p< .05  
 
 
     
β= -.22* 
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Figure 4. Aggression as a function of ostracism condition and general beliefs in a just 
world (Study 4).  
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General Just-world Beliefs 
Internal Attribution 
 Aggression Behavior  
β= .29* β= -.37** 
 
(β= -.24+) 
Figure 5. Internal attribution mediates the relationship between general just-world 
beliefs on aggressive behavior following ostracism (Study 4). Coefficients are 
standardized. 
**p<= .01, *p< .05, +p< .10 
 
 
     
β= -.35** 
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Footnotes 
1. Following the recommendation by Williams (2007), the terms “ostracism,” 
“social exclusion,” “social rejection” are largely treated as synonyms and 
interchangeable in this article. 
2. An independent sample of 56 undergraduates was recruited to examine the 
validity of the general just-world beliefs manipulation used in Studies 2 and 3. 
After reading an article arguing that the world was just or not, as in Studies 2 and 
3, participants completed several measures to access general just-world beliefs 
(e.g., “I think basically the world is a just place”; Dalbert, 1999), general 
self-efficacy (e.g., “I can manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough”; 
Zhang & Schwarzer, 1995), locus of control (e.g., “My life is determined by my 
own actions”; Levenson, 1981), optimism (e.g., “I am always optimistic about 
my future”; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), beliefs in norms of accountability 
(e.g., “I should be fully accountable for my future”), nothing-to-lose mindset 
(e.g., “I have nothing to lose if I act inappropriately”), and system 
justification/identification (e.g., “Most policies serve the greater good”; Kay & 
Jost, 2003). The results revealed that participants in the strong just-world beliefs 
condition had higher general just-world beliefs than participants in the weak 
just-world beliefs condition, F (1, 54) = 11.97, p= .001, ηp2= .18. However, 
participants in the two conditions reported similar levels of general self-efficacy, 
locus of control (internality, powerful others and chance), optimism, beliefs in 
norms of accountability, nothing-to-lose mindset, and system 
justification/identification, Fs(1, 54) <= 2.01, ps >= .16. Participants also 
completed a one-item measure, “The world we live in is just and fair”. We 
obtained a similar result if we treated this item as a manipulation check. 
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Participants in the strong just-world beliefs condition had higher general 
just-world beliefs than participants in the weak just-world beliefs condition, F (1, 
54) = 16.893, p <.001, ηp2 = .24. As this item was positively correlated with the 
general just-world beliefs scale (r= .55, p< .001), it was served as a manipulation 
check of our general just-world beliefs manipulation in Studies 2 and 3. 
3. In Studies 2 and 3, a few participants expressed suspicions about whether the ball 
tossing game was controlled by the computer. Past research has shown that 
participants who were explicitly told that the ball tossing game was completely 
controlled by computers had similar responses than those who were told that they 
were playing with other individuals (see Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004). 
Therefore, we did not have strong reasons to remove these participants in the 
analyses. It should be also noted that removing these participants did not 
substantially alter the results. 
4. We thank one anonymous reviewer for recommending Study 4. 
5. We also conducted a bootstrapping analysis (with 5,000 iterations) to test the 
same mediation in the misfortune condition. The results revealed an indirect 
effect, with a point estimate of -.05. The 95% confidence interval for the indirect 
path coefficient through internal attributions of misfortune experience did not 
exclude 0 (-.29 to .04), suggesting that the mediation was not statistically 
significant in the misfortune condition. 
